What was dien bien phu falls

The simple question of resupplying this base by air was a terrific strain. And there was great talk on contingency plans about using nuclear weapons, which as far as I was concerned would have been a great disaster, as you would have probably wiped out the French along with the Vietnamese. And politically as far as the Far East goes, it would be the second use of a nuclear weapon, by Americans against Asians. I returned, I think it was July and it was a big difference, there was a big difference in atmosphere.

There was heightened tension between the French and the Americans. A lot of them blamed it on us. That we could have brought in more supplies or done something mainly supplied an air strike. And there was great confusion among the Vietnamese and there was a sudden swing of many among influential Vietnamese, who had been with the French, who could tell what was going on. Towards the Americans, who were the new boys on the block. Ed Lansdale, you know, the CIA team, [they] were there putting him in place and I worked for, with them, and worked as the press advisor for Diem for a short time.

And it was a weird period, this king-making business. You know, Americans are not very used to it. Soon after I got there in — after all, there were the two of us — I was asked to do some political reporting and Voice of America needed some feed as well. What I suddenly found myself doing, and I must admit, was great. You took your jeep from Vientiane and you drove to Kadoona, 10 or 15 kilometers down the road. There you were met by a pirogue, a small, dugout canoe.

They would row me across the river, and then I would find myself being met by a Thai army jeep. The Thai army jeep drove me another 10 or 15 kilometers, inland, to a place called Udorn. There was the United States Air Force in all its glory. Now, this is I would then go up. They had [DC-3] Dakotas, that is all they had. I would fly with them. They were dropping supplies to a place called Sanyo, which was southeast, northwest, which was a big Vietnamese-Laotian army depot, French actually.

You were carrying supplies to those, because they were always fighting. The kind of supplies that were being carried was mainly barbed wire, but also a lot of medical things, food, other things. More recently, Windrow and Boylan and Olivier continue in the same vein by adding new perspectives decades after the events.

Beyond a simple account of the battle, Morgan and Journoud offer a broader perspective. The latter analyzes in depth the battle as a turning point of the colonial history of France.

These comprehensive publications tell the whole story from a Western point of view. Hastings offers a British look at thirty years of war in Vietnam. On the Vietnamese side, nothing is comparable to these books that respect historical research standards.

William J. Duiker, a former US Foreign Service officer, and an academic historian, published two major works, Duiker and Duiker Boylan, Kevin, and Luc Olivier. Oxford: Osprey, This publication is the most comprehensive and up-to-date detailed history of the battle.

It is probably the book to read first, especially without having time to go further. Beyond academic history, its American and French authors share the same interest in wargaming simulations.

Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. Boulder, CO: Westview, Ho Chi Minh: A Life. New York: Hyperion, Fall, Bernard B. Philadelphia: Lippincott, Bernard B. Fall was a political scientist with a versatile background from World War II to the Vietnam War, where he died from a mine explosion in Marcel Bigeard, in command of a parachute battalion in Dien Bien Phu, celebrated this book.

Published during the Vietnam War, it offers an historical narrative by an author with both French and American roots. Fontenay-sous-Bois, France: Anako, Hastings, Max.

We believe that the fall of Dien Bien Phu, if it occurred as assumed in the problem, would result from: a French capitulation; or b an overwhelming of the French either by assault or by gradual constriction of the French position.

If the French were to capitulate without further heavy fighting, the adverse military and political consequences would be essentially similar in kind, though possibly of greater intensity, to those accompanying the fall of the fortress through heavy fighting.

Viet Minh losses in the event of capitulation would be less than those which would be incurred during further heavy fighting. In any event, the Viet Minh would have suffered heavy losses in the prolonged fighting at Dien Bien Phu.

Estimated Viet Minh casualties in the fighting there to date are approximately 13,; roughly 50 percent of this number have been killed or rendered permanently ineffective. Although a few experienced units have been sent as reinforcements, individual replacements for the most part have consisted of partially trained personnel. As a result of the Dien Bien Phu operation, the effectiveness of the Viet Minh offensive striking force will be greatly reduced during the next two or three months.

French Union casualties at Dien Bien Phu to date have been approximately 5, The defeat of the force now at Dien Bien Phu would add another 11,, thus bringing the total French Union losses to roughly 17, At least two-thirds of these troops are experienced, professional units from Algerian, colonial and foreign legion forces. Moreover, [word missing] of the thirteen parachute battalions in the French Union forces in Indochina are at Dien Bien Phu.

The loss of these elite French Union troops would reduce the French Union offensive striking force by approximately one quarter, thus markedly reducing over-all French Union capabilities for offensive operations in Indochina.

As a consequence of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the morale of the French Union forces would receive a severe blow. Their will to win would be diminished, largely because of a widespread belief that military victory was no longer possible. The loss of morale would probably not be sufficient to reduce the effectiveness of the professional soldiers of the French Expeditionary force.

However, a crucial factor in the military situation thereafter would be the reliability of native units, particularly the Vietnamese. There would almost certainly be an increase in Vietnam desertions, and the possibility cannot be excluded that the native components of French Union forces might disintegrate.

Therefore, we estimate that the impact upon the morale of the French Union forces would be severe, but not of such severity as to preclude their employment as an effective military force during the next two or three months. The fall of Dien Bien Phu would not in itself substantially alter the relative military capabilities of French Union and Viet Minh forces in Indochina during the next two or three months unless there were large-scale desertions from the French Union forces.

The victorious Viet Minh troops at Dien Bien Phu would have suffered heavy casualties and their efficiency would be reduced. In order to bring these forces up to full strength, the Viet Minh would probably move them from Dien Bien Phu to their main supply and training areas adjacent to the Red River delta. Prior to the rainy season, this redeployment would require at least three to four weeks. After the full onset of the rainy season, which is unlikely before mid-May, the movement would take between two and three months to complete.